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continuity with what preceded? And (2) does not a principle of organization whose type is found in "progressive self-integrating experience" carry us beyond Darwinism and the principle of natural selection?

J. E. C.

Le socialisme et la sociologie réformatrice. Par ALFRED FOUILLÉE. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909. — pp. viii, 419.

The greatest problem left us by the nineteenth century is, M. Fouillée believes, the deep-rooted antagonism between the proletariat and the small capitalist class, an antagonism which has resulted from the revolution in industry caused by the introduction of machinery and from the concentration of wealth due to modern methods of finance. Economic individualism would solve this problem by the principles of a false philosophy which substitutes an abstraction—the 'economic' individual—for the real human person, and defines justice as the right of this individual to freely exchange his labor or the products of his labor for other products of equal value. Socialism, on the contrary, offers an utopian theory of society without adequate scientific basis, and deriving strength chiefly from its appeal to sentiments partly generous and partly selfish and envious.

According to the author of the present work, the solution of this problem is properly the task of a *sociologie réformatrice*. Such a sociology will proceed on the principles laid down by Aug. Comte, who founded it on a secure scientific basis and believed that it should be given authority over political and economic administration. It will view all social problems in their proper historic perspective, recognizing that society in its evolution necessarily passes through three main stages: first, that of primitive social solidarity in which the individual is identified with the group—family, clan or tribe—without any consent on his part; second that in which the individual frees himself from the group, claims his rights and asserts his independence as an individual; and, third, that final synthetic stage in which all individuals are reunited in an organic system formed through their own volition because required for individual self-realization. In the present emergency sociology as a science is bound to reject the fallacies of both individualism and collectivism, and to determine the actual conditions under which the third and perfect type of social organization may be made possible. This end may be secured—M. Fouillée maintains—through the recognition of two principles, first that of the *organisme contractuel*, and, second, that of *justice réparative*. The conception of society as a contractual organism reconciles two opposing social theories. The one bases social organization upon psychological grounds and conceives it as the result of a more or less explicit agreement entered into voluntarily by the individuals concerned. The other asserts the basis of society to be biological, believing it to be rooted in a social instinct and thus a response to organic demands. An adequate social theory must combine the truth of these opposing views: understanding society as grounded upon an instinct

fundamental to human nature, which finds expression, however, in voluntary agreement and intelligent coöperation. As a logical implication of this conception of social organization, there follows the correlative principle of reparatory justice. If society is truly an organization, then in the interplay of organs — never perfectly adjusted — some parts will inevitably suffer, and it is the concern of the whole organism that these parts should be relieved and restored. And if — to state the same truth in other words — society is a voluntary association, then the universal discharge of the contractual obligation is certain to work to the disadvantage of some. It thus becomes the duty of society — and particularly so far as its intelligence and purpose are emphasized — to compensate these individuals for the ill they suffer. The present economic situation affords striking illustration of the need for, and rightfulness of, reparatory justice. The introduction of machinery, although a necessary step in social evolution, has nevertheless deprived many individuals of a large part of the product of their own labor and has also taken from them the control of the conditions under which they work. Now machinery is in no proper sense an individual possession, but a social instrument rightfully used by society for its own advancement. Since this is true, justice will compel society to make reparation for the ills which its use inflicts upon the worker, by intervening and securing for him a larger control over the conditions under which he toils and a greater share in the product of his labor. In his conclusion the author shows that a correct conception of society will not permit one to think of state and individual as so externally related that the power of the one can be increased only at the expense of the other. Rather do these opposites enter the social synthesis as complementary factors, each of which derives its meaning and reality from its other. The central power must be strengthened in order that the freedom of the individual may be preserved, and, conversely, the rights of the individuals must be preserved in order that the state attain closest unity and greatest power. In his ultimate social philosophy the author states his agreement with Hegel, except that he regards the social synthesis as a vital rather than a dialectical process.

The reviewer has here attempted to give only the fundamental tenets of Fouillée's social theory. The book contains a detailed critique of the principles and doctrines of socialism and also a brief discussion of new forms of communal effort such as the syndicate, coöperative enterprise, and state ownership of public utilities.

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Herbert Spencer's Grundlagen der Philosophie. Von P. HÄBERLIN.
Leipzig, Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1908. — pp. iv, 205.

This treatise aims to supply what has been hitherto lacking in German philosophical literature — a critical study not of a particular portion of Spencer's philosophy but of the fundamental principles that underlie the